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Grennan's discussion opens with an analysis of how the credibility of the arguer can be 
reliably factored in to the evaluation process. He demonstrates quite clearly how important 
judgements of credibility are in real world arguments, and describes an approach which manages 
at once to handle credibility cleanly, to respect logical autonomy, and to be sufficiently 
straightforward to give to one's students without compunction. 
Grennan suggests that in an argument with two or more premises, the approach could 
founder. In an argument demonstrating linked structure, we would expect the argument to fall 
down completely if one premise were unreliable. But he identifies a problem with convergent 
argument structure too. Specifically, if one of the premises adduced in support of a conclusion is 
judged to be absolutely unreliable, then, by laws of probabilistic combination, support provided 
by all premises is absolutely unreliable. This result, he suggests, is "too paradoxical to be 
acceptable". It is worth noting that perhaps in some situations this is exactly the result, though 
for rhetorical rather than argumentation theoretic reasons. If I demonstrate my faults by the 
fatuousness, inanity or, perhaps, insanity, of one of my premises, then my audience may well as 
a result utterly discount all the other premises that I may bring to bear. 
But this is an extreme case. In more usual situations, I readily concede that we would want 
somehow to retain the probabilistic support of good sibling premises. There is an analogy here 
with the functioning of a venerable computer system from artificial intelligence. MYCIN 
(Shortliffe, 1976) was an expert system designed on a probabilistic basis to aid in medical 
diagnosis. Though at heart nothing more complex than a large set of IF-THEN rules, its 
processing can be seen as the construction of arguments of a sort. Each support link in MYCIN 
arguments has a probabilistic weight attached to it. The methods of combining separate 
arguments—both linked and convergent—are then very simple. If there are two premises 
supporting a conclusion independently, then the weight of conviction attached to that conclusion 
is simply the maximum of the two premise weights. Similarly, in a linked argument, it is the 
minimum of the premise weights that is carried to the conclusion.  
MYCIN also suffered from many failings. One such is typified by the following apocryphal 
dialogue: 
MYCIN:  What is the patient's name? 
User:  A Ford Mustang 
MYCIN: How old is the patient? 
User:  14 years 
MYCIN: What symptoms does the patient display? 
User:  Pale brown spots 
MYCIN: Are the spots localised or are they found all over the body? 
User:  All over the body 
MYCIN: The patient has measles with probability 0.98  
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Though the problem manifest here is of central concern in artificial intelligence (Lenat, 
1991), it might be hoped that argument evaluation might not be faced with quite such atrocious 
reasoning. But nonetheless, the techniques that MYCIN—and its descendants—employ might be 
of use in the approach proposed here by Grennan—and all the more so for their clarity and 
simplicity. 
The other criticism that was levelled at MYCIN—but, incidentally, that MYCIN weathered 
well as a result of its practical utility—was one of knowledge elicitation. The process by which 
the probabilities were determined in the first place and entered in to MYCIN's knowledge base 
was fraught with difficulties. In some cases, medical statistics could be employed, but often it 
was up to a team involving a computer scientist and a domain expert, to fix exact probabilities 
upon relationships that experts had typically never viewed in a probabilistic way at all. I wonder 
if probabilistic approaches to real world argumentation will suffer similar difficulties: can we 
often have the luxury of knowing an arguer's track record is one of 83% reliability? 
The only other real criticism of the work is its premature conclusion. With the effective 
method of approximating a rather cumbersome calculation, the technique seems eminently 
applicable to larger arguments. There is much work to be done on determining how the results of 
'setting premises aside' and combining their relative weights can propagate through larger 
argumentation structures and I follow with keen interest the developments to come from this 
work.  
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